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v 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH 
VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
a body politic of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this appeal is conferred upon the Utah 
Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann, § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1993), 
providing for appellate jurisdiction over "orders, judgments, and 
decrees of any court of record over which the court of appeals does 
not have original jurisdiction." 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's 
Complaint alleging negligence against Utah Valley Community College 
for failure to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act. 
2. Whether plaintiff's Complaint, whether sounding in tort 
or contract, must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted since plaintiff has failed to name the 
Case No. 930566 
920905486PD 
Priority 15 
proper party. 
Standard of Review: Assuming the factual allegations made by 
plaintiff to be true, the appellate court reviews the trial court's 
rulings to see whether the prevailing party was nevertheless 
entitled to dismissal as a matter of law. Therefore, the appellate 
court applies a correction-of-error standard of review to the trial 
court's ruling. Neel v. State, 854 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App. 1993); 
citing Anderson v. Dean, 841 P.2d 742, 744 (Utah App. 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Determinative provisions are reproduced in Addendum A to this 
Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final judgment dated October 13, 1993 
of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, the 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley presiding, granting defendant's motion 
to dismiss plaintiff's claims for recovery of payment by plaintiff 
(the insurer) to Larry J. Remm (the insured) of personal injury 
protection benefits (PIP benefits) arising from a low impact 
automobile accident involving a second car driven by Mike Jacobsen, 
an employee of Utah Valley Community College (the named defendant). 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Plaintiff filed its Complaint on January 20, 1993. The 
defendants timely moved for dismissal on February 1, 1993, stating 
that plaintiff's Complaint was untimely, named the wrong party, and 
failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Governmental 
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Immunity Act. Plaintiff moved to amend the Complaint, then moved 
to file a second amended Complaint. By a Minute Entry dated June 
15, 1993, Judge Medley granted defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Plaintiff then moved to vacate the Minute Entry and requested oral 
argument. In a second Minute Entry dated September 15, 1993, the 
trial court judge reiterated his prior ruling: (1) defendants' 
motion to dismiss plaintiff's first cause of action was granted for 
failure to comply with the strict notice requirements of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act; (2) defendants' motion to dismiss 
plaintiff's second cause of action was granted for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 31A-22-309(5); and 
(3) the court specifically found the case Neel v. State "to be 
distinguishable from the present case." (Minute Entry and Order of 
Dismissal attached as Addenda B and C.) The Order of Dismissal was 
entered on October 13, 1993, plaintiff was given Notice of Entry of 
the Order on October 25, 1993 and this appeal was filed on November 
12, 1993. 
Statement of Facts 
For purposes of the defendants' motion to dismiss, the 
following facts were undisputed and are set forth in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, the non-moving party. 
On February 15, 1991 at approximately 1:00 p.m., a vehicle 
operated by Larry J. Remm was hit by a vehicle operated by Mike 
Jacobsen at a speed of approximately 2 miles per hour. (The police 
report describing the incident is attached hereto as Addendum D.) 
While there was no damage to either vehicle, driver Remm alleged 
3 
damages totalling $2,257.00. These medical expenses were paid by 
Remm's insurance company, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company 
pursuant to the policy's personal injury protection benefits. Bear 
River Mutual Insurance Company brought this action against Mike 
Jacobsen, who was, at the time at issue, an employee of Utah Valley 
Community College, in an attempt to recover from him the PIP 
benefits paid to Remm. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to these 
answering defendants. It is clear that under the laws of this 
state an insurer does not have a tort claim against a private 
person to recover PIP benefits. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(1) , 
(1953, as amended) specifically excludes recovery from a tort-
feasor of PIP benefits totalling less than $3,000.00. Accordingly, 
the PIP benefits paid to Remm, without regard to fault, are not 
recoverable from the insured tort-feasor by either the injured 
party or his insurer. In other words, under no construct of the 
present facts, can Mr. Jacobsen or his employer be liable to Mr. 
Remm's insurer for PIP benefits. 
Alternatively, if Utah Valley Community College is the 
properly named defendant, then the plaintiff has failed to comply 
with the Governmental Immunity Act's strict notice requirements or 
with the applicable statute of limitations. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED FOR 
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM IN LAW OR IN FACT 
AGAINST THE TORT-FEASOR OR THE TORT-FEASOR'S 
EMPLOYER FOR RECOVERY OF PIP BENEFITS. 
It is well settled in this state that an injured party's 
insurer has no claim for recovery of PIP benefits against a secured 
owner or operator of a vehicle. Laub v. South Central Utah 
Telephone Asso., 657 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Utah 1982); Allstate v. I vie. 
606 P.2d 1197, 1201 (Utah 1980). 
In reaching this result, the Utah Supreme Court in Ivie 
relied, in part, on the language now found in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
22-309(1), (1953, as amended): 
No person has direct benefit coverage under a 
policy which includes personal injury 
protection may maintain a cause of action for 
general damages arising out of personal 
injuries alleged to have been caused by an 
automobile accident except where the person 
has sustained one or more of the following: 
(a) deaf; (b) dismemberment; (c) permanent 
disability; (d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of 
$3,000.00. 
Accordingly, PIP benefits up to the amount of $3,000 which are 
paid to an injured person without regard to fault are not 
recoverable from an insured tort-feasor by either the injured party 
or his insurer. U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee v. United States, 728 F. 
Supp. 651, 655 (D. Utah 1989). 
In the U.S. Fidelity case, the Federal District Court, 
applying Utah law, rejected plaintiff's argument that the 
government, being self-insured, was in similar circumstances to a 
tort-feasor's insurance company and was therefore subject to inter-
company reimbursement under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(6) (1953, 
as amended). 
Simply put, under the law of this state, the insurer (Bear 
River Mutual Insurance Company) has no right of subrogation as to 
funds obtained by the insured through either settlement or judgment 
against the tort-feasor. Laub v. South Central Utah Telephone 
Asso. , 657 P. 2d at 1309. The no-fault insurer's only right of 
reimbursement through subrogation is against the liability insurer 
in an arbitration proceeding. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 
at 1202. 
In this case, the no-fault insurer has made no claim against 
the liability insurer. Even if it had, his sole remedy would be 
through arbitration. Consequently, plaintiff's Complaint fails as 
a matter of law. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FAILS SINCE 
THERE IS NO CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF 
INSURER AND THE DEFENDANT EMPLOYER. 
Plaintiff's second cause of action, an apparent attempt to 
evade application of the Governmental Immunity Act's notice 
requirements, is fundamentally flawed. There is no contract, nor 
is there privity of contract, between plaintiff and defendants. 
Further, there is no basis to imply a contract from the language of 
the insurance code. Simply, Utah Valley Community College is not 
an "insurer" and is therefore not governed by the provisions of the 
Utah Insurance Code. 
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Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(48)(a) defines 
"insurer" and states that the definition of insurer "does not 
include a government entity as defined in § 63-30-2(3) to the 
extent it is engaged in activities described in § 31A-12-107." 
Section 31A-12-107 states that a governmental entity, such as Utah 
Valley Community College in this action, is not an insurer, for the 
purposes of this title and is not engaged in the business of 
insurance. 
To fall under the holding of Neel v. State, plaintiff would 
have had to sue the State of Utah and argue the State was a self-
insurer. Neel held that a suit to recover PIP benefits brought 
directly against the State as the self-insurer of its motor 
vehicles is contractual in nature and therefore plaintiff need not 
comply with the notice of claim and undertaking requirements found 
in the Governmental Immunity Act. Further, Neel held that if the 
State is deemed to be a self-insurer of the vehicle, then 
arbitration is the sole legal means for plaintiff to attempt to 
recover payment of PIP benefits. Cf. McCafferv on behalf of 
McCafferv v. Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1990). 
Alternatively, if Bear River Mutual Insurance Company wanted 
to recover personal injury protection benefits from the insurer of 
the vehicle, Risk Management for the State of Utah should have been 
the named defendant. Since this action was brought solely against 
Jacobsen and Utah Valley Community College and not against the 
State of Utah, plaintiff's Complaint fails as a matter of law. 
Plaintiffs in similar situations have been denied subrogation 
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claims for recovery of PIP benefits. See Allstate v. Ivie, 606 
P.2d 1197, 1202-3 (Utah 1980); U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee v. U.S., 
728 F. Supp. 651, 655 (D. Utah 1989). 
Also, State employees may not be entitled to recover from the 
State for PIP benefits because of the exclusive remedy provision of 
the Workers Compensation Act. See Neel v. State, 854 P. 2d 581, 585 
footnote 3 (Utah 1993) (citing IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 
P. 2d 296 (Utah 1975)) (holding employees may not recover additional 
benefits from an employer's no-fault insurance policy). 
Consequently, even if plaintiff argued Jacobsen should recover 
against the State on Remm's behalf, Jacobsen would be precluded 
from such recovery. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION SOUNDING IN 
NEGLIGENCE WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED 
Assuming Utah Valley Community College is the proper 
defendant, the cause of action sounding in negligence must be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim. Specifically, Utah's 
Governmental Immunity Act requires that a compulsory condition 
precedent to maintaining a negligence action against the State, any 
of its agencies, or a political subdivision, is that an individual 
must file a notice of claim. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-12 and 13 
(1953, as amended). The claim is "barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the Attorney General and the agency concerned within one 
year after the claim arises, or before the expiration of any 
extension of time granted under § 63-30-11." Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30-12 (Supp. 1989) . 
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The notice of claim requirements set forth in Utah's 
Governmental Immunity Act are mandatory and "strict compliance" is 
the statutory standard. The Utah Supreme Court has held that 
"where a cause of action is based upon a statute, full compliance 
with its requirements is a condition precedent to the right to 
maintain a suit." Scarbourqh v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 
480, 482 (Utah 1975). 
In the present case, plaintiff's cause of action arose on 
February 15, 1991, the date of Remm's accident. Plaintiff alleges 
that it filed a notice of claim with Salt Lake County on March 28, 
1991. This notice of claim is of no affect since Salt Lake County 
has no governing relationship to Utah Valley Community College 
whatsoever. 
To establish notice of claim was properly served on Utah 
Valley Community College, plaintiff must establish that it served 
its notice of claim on both Attorney General's office and on Utah 
Valley Community College. A search of the notices of claim 
received by the Attorney General's office failed to produce a 
notice of claim from either Larry J. Remm or Bear River Mutual 
Insurance Company. (See Affidavit of Shauna Herrera, attached as 
Addendum E.) Plaintiff has never even alleged that notice was 
served on Utah Valley Community College in this action. 
Finally, even if we construe plaintiff's attempts to file 
proper notice as adequate, plaintiff's complaint was not filed in 
a timely manner and is therefore barred. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15 requires a claimant to begin the 
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action within one year after the denial of the claim or within one 
year after the 90-day denial period specified in § 63-30-14. 
Plaintiff alleges it filed a notice of claim on March 28, 1991 and 
that the claim was denied. If we assume that the claim was denied 
by allowing the 90-day denial period to run, plaintiff's claim was 
deemed to have been denied on June 26, 1991. Therefore, plaintiff 
was required to file its Complaint by June 26, 1992. In fact, 
plaintiff's Complaint is dated September 26, 1992. 
Consequently, plaintiff's action is barred due to its failure 
to service a notice of claim on both the Attorney General's office 
and Utah Valley Community College and due to its failure to file a 
Complaint within the statutorily prescribed period as provided in 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15(2). Plaintiff's Complaint was properly 
dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the fact plaintiff has attempted to amend its 
Complaint, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company has failed to 
identify the proper party to this action. Accordingly, plaintiff's 
Complaint was properly dismissed. For the above reasons, the 
judgment of the district court should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1 | day of March, 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
SidSt 
ELIZABETH KING 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES was mailed this 14 day of March, 
1994, postage prepaid, to: 
Thomas A. Duffin 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB 
& JACKSON 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 31A-1-301 
(e) providing other persons with insurance as defined in Subsec-
tion (40); 
(f) making as insurer, guarantor, or surety, or proposing to make 
as insurer, guarantor, or surety, any contract or policy of title insur-
ance; 
(g) transacting or proposing to transact any phase of title insur-
ance, including solicitation, negotiation preliminary to execution, ex-
ecution of a contract of title insurance, insuring, and transacting 
matters subsequent to the execution of the contract and arising out of 
it, including reinsurance; and 
(h) doing, or proposing to do, any business in substance equivalent 
to Subsections (a) through (g) in a manner designed to evade the 
provisions of this title. 
(45) "Insurance consultant" or "consultant" means a person who ad-
vises other persons about insurance needs and coverages, is compensated 
by the person advised on a basis not directly related to the insurance 
placed, and is not compensated directly or indirectly by an insurer, agent, 
or broker for advice given. Refer also to Subsection 31A-23-102(3) for 
exceptions to this definition. 
(46) "Insurance holding company system" means a group of two or 
more affiliated persons, at least one of whom is an insurer. 
(47) "Insured" means a person to whom or for whose benefit an insurer 
makes a promise in an insurance policy. The term includes policyholders, 
subscribers, members, and beneficiaries. This definition applies only to 
the provisions of this title and does not define the meaning of this word as 
used in insurance policies or certificates. 
(48) (a) "Insurer" means any person doing an insurance business as a 
principal, including fraternal benefit societies, issuers of gift annu-
ities other than those specified in Subsections 31A-22-1305(2) and 
(3), motor clubs, employee welfare plans, and any person purporting 
or intending to do an insurance business as a principal on his own 
account. It does not include a governmental entity, as defined in 
Subsection 63-30-2(3), to the extent it is engaged in the activities 
described in Section 31A-12-107. 
(b) "Admitted insurer" is defined in Subsection (80)(b). 
(c) "Alien insurer" is defined in Subsection (3). 
(d) "Authorized insurer" is defined in Subsection (80)(b). 
(e) "Domestic insurer" is defined in Subsection (27). 
(f) "Foreign insurer" is defined in Subsection (32). 
(g) "Nonadmitted insurer" is defined in Subsection (80)(a). 
(h) "Unauthorized insurer" is defined in Subsection (80)(a). 
(49) "Legal expense insurance" means insurance written to indemnify 
or pay for specified legal expenses. It includes arrangements that create 
reasonable expectations of enforceable rights, but it does not include the 
provision of, or reimbursement for, legal services incidental to other in-
surance coverages. Refer to Section 31A-1-103 for a list of exemptions. 
(50) (a) "Liability insurance" means insurance against liability: 
(i) for death, injury, or disability of any human being, or for 
damage to property, exclusive of the coverages under Subsection 
(53) for medical malpractice insurance, Subsection (66) for pro-
31A-12-107. Governmental immunity. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, a governmental entity, as 
defined in Subsection 63-30-2(3), is not an insurer for purposes of this title and 
is not engaged in the business of insurance to the extent it is covering its own 
liabilities under Chapter 30, Title 63, the Governmental Immunity Act, or 
engaging in other related risk management activities related to the normal 
course of its activities. A public agency insurance mutual created or regulated 
under Section 31A-5-214 is a governmental entity entitled to all the rights 
and benefits of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-12-107, enacted by 
L. 1986, ch. 204, * 87; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 12, 
§7. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 (1st S.S.) 
amendment, effective June 5,1987, substituted 
"Chapter 30, Title 63, the Governmental Im-
munity Act" for "the Governmental Immunity 
Act, Chapter 30, Title 63" in the first sentence 
and substituted the present second sentence for 
the former second sentence which read "A pub-
lic agency mutual created under Section 
31A-5-214 is an insurer and is engaged in the 
business of insurance." 
31A-22-309 INSURANCE CODE 
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which 
may be contained in other types of coverage. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 
are reduced by: 
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a 
result of an accident covered in this code under any workers' compensa-
tion or similar statutory plan; and 
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive 
from the United States or any of its agencies because he is on active duty 
in the military service. 
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy, 
including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given 
by the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident. 
(5) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be 
made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. Benefits for any period are 
overdue if they are not paid within 30 days after the insurer receives reason-
able proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the period. If 
reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount supported 
by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 30 days after that proof is 
received by the insurer. Any part or all of the remainder of the claim that is 
later supported by reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days 
after the proof is received by the insurer. If the insurer fails to pay the ex-
penses when due, these expenses shall bear interest at the rate of \lk% per 
month after the due date. The person entitled to the benefits may bring an 
action in contract to recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the 
insurer is required by the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the 
insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant. 
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to 
the following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally 
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits 
required under personal injury protection have been paid by another in-
surer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of 
the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other 
insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages 
recoverable; and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount 
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-309, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, $ 27; 1986, ch. 204, * 160; 
1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, * 10; 1991, ch. 74, * 8; 
1992, ch. 230, $ 9. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective Apnl 29,1991, made minor sty-
listic changes in Subsection (1) and rewrote 
Subsection (2 Ha Hi), which read: "for any inju-
ries sustained by the injured while occupying 
another motor vehicle owned by the insured 
and not insured under the policy." 
The 1992 amendment, effective Apnl 27, 
1992, inserted "or is required to have" near the 
beginning of Subsection (1). 
63-30-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages 
against a governmental entity or against an employee. 
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, em-
ployees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing 
body, members of a board, members of a commission, or members of 
an advisory body, officers and employees in accordance with Section 
62A-4-603, student teachers certificated in accordance with Section 
53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing services 
to members of the public in the course of an approved medical, nurs-
ing, or other professional health care clinical training program, vol-
unteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent contractor. 
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsec-
tion (2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position re-
ceives compensation. 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivi-
sions as defined in this chapter. 
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, opera-
tion, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or 
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is char-
63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time for 
filing notice. 
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employ-
ment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with 
the attorney general and the agency concerned within one year after the claim 
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 12; 1978, ch. 
27, § 6; 1983, ch. 131, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment near the end of the section substituted 
"Section 63-30-11" for "Subsection 63-30-11(4)" 
and added "regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is character-
ized as governmental" and made minor 
changes in phraseology. 
Cross-References. — Actions arising out of 
contractual rights or obligations not subject to 
this section, § 63-30-5. 
Health Care Malpractice Act, § 78-14-1 et 
seq. 
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time 
for filing action against governmental entity. 
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district 
court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity. 
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the 
claim or within one year after the denial period specified in this chapter has 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 63-30-16 
expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, f 15; 1963, ch. The 1987 amendment a*. . the designa-
129, i 6; 1965, ch. 62, f 2; 1967, ch. 75, f 7. tions to the previously undesignated section; in 
Amendment Note*. — The 1985 amend- Subsection (2), added at the end nregardless of 
ment substituted "or an employee of the en- whether or not the function giving rise to the 
tity" for "in those circumstances in which im- &}& ^ characterized as governmental"; and 
munityfrom suit has been waived in this chap- n ^ ^^^ changes in phraseology 
ter" at the end of the first sentence. 
ADDENDUM B 
<Wf£ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BECEWED 
SEP \ 1 W 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL 
PLAINTIFF 
vs 
JACOBSEN, MIKE 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 920905486 PD 
DATE 09/15/93 
HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
COURT REPORTER 
CQURT CLERK AJG 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. DUFFIN, THOMAS A. 
D. ATTY. OCHOA, BARBARA H 
PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO VACE MINUE ENTRY DATED JUNE 16,1993, MOTION 
TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT, AND MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL ORAL 
ARGUMENT ARE SUMMARILY DENIED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS; 
1) THE JUNE 16, 1993 MINUTE ENTRY ENCOMPASED THE ISSUES 
RAISED IN THE FOREGOING MOTIONS. 
2) THE COURT REVIEWED NEIL VS STATE OF UTAH PRIOR TO 
PREPARATION OF JUNE 16, 1993 MINUTE ENTRY AND FOUND 
NEIL TO BE DISTINGUISHABLE FFROM THE PRESENT CASE. 
3) THE COURT SUBMITS SECOND REOUEST TO THE STATE OF UTAH 
TO PREPARE AN ORDER CONSISTENT WITH THIS MINUTE ENTRY 
AND THE JUNE 16, 1993 MINUTE ENTRY 
CC: THOMAS A DUFFIN 
BARBARA H. OCHOA 
ADDENDUM C 
JAN GRAHAM - 1231 
Attorney General 
BARBARA E. OCHOA - 4102 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 575-1650 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH 
VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE, : 
a body politic of the Civil No. 920905486PD 
State of Utah, : 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendants. : 
This matter came before the Court on April 19, 1993 on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
presiding. Plaintiff was represented by counsel, Thomas A. Duffin, 
and Defendant was represented by counsel, Barbara E. Ochoa, 
Assistant Attorney General. In addition, the Court has considered 
the following motions which were subsequently submitted by 
Plaintiff: Motion to Vacate Minute Entry Dated June 16, 1993; 
Motion to File Amended Complaint; and Motion for Additional Oral 
Argument. 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file, having heard 
the argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, 
Third Jucu;.-
OCT 1 3 1993 
:-3b-.y CierK 
now orders as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's first cause of 
action is granted for the reason that Plaintiff failed to comply 
with the strict notice requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
2. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's second cause of 
action is granted for the reason that Plaintiff's complaint fails 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under U.C.A. 
§ 31A-22-309(5). 
3. Plaintiff's Motions to Vacate Minute Entry Dated June 16, 
1993, to File an Amended Complaint and for Additional Oral Argument 
are denied for the reasons that the June 16, 1993 minute entry 
encompassed the issues raised in Plaintiff's subsequent motions and 
the Court had reviewed Neel v. State of Utah prior to issuing the 
Minute Entry of June 16, 1993, and found it to be distinguishable 
from the present case. __^ __ 
DATED this / ? day of 6/ y
 r 1993 . 
BY TJffi COURT: 
10NE E. MEDLEY 
Thircfl/ District Court b%t&g 
Approved as to form: 
THOMAS A. DUFFIN 
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ADDENDUM E 
JAN GRAHAM - 1231 
Attorney General 
BARBARA OCHOA - 4102 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 575-1650 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH VALLEY 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, a body 
politic of the State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SHAUNA HERRERA 
Civil No. 920905486PD 
Judge Glenn Iwasaki 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE j 
I, Shauna Herrera, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
depose and state as follows: 
1. That I am# and at all times referred to herein was, 
the Lead Secretary for the Litigation Division of the Attorney 
General's Office for the State of Utah. That this Affidavit is 
based upon my own personal knowledge and upon the records and 
files maintained by the Utah Attorney General's Office in the 
ordinary and regular course of its business. 
2. That in connection with my duties as said, I 
maintain under my custody and control, all notices of claim 
received by the Utah Attorney General's Office and have done so 
since December 27, 1982. 
3. That I have reviewed the notices of claim received 
by the Utah Attorney General's Office, including the period 
February 15, 1991 to the present, and no notice of claim from or 
on behalf of Larry J. Remm or Bear River Mutual Insurance Company 
has been received by the Utah Attorney General's Office. 
My Commission Expires: 
7/?/ffr 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT, postage prepaid, this ft 
day of February, 1993, to the following: 
Thomas A. Duffin 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State Street, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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